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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change presents an ever more urgent threat, and in 2019, 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels reached an all-time high.1 Current federal 
policies promoting fossil fuel extraction2 implicate how future governments 
* © 2019 Kevin J. Lynch. Associate Professor of Law, Sturm College of Law,
University of Denver. J.D. 2007, New York University School of Law; B.A., 2001, Rice 
University.    
1. Recent measurements of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reached 415 parts 
per million, a level not seen in approximately three million years. E.g., Denise Chow, 
Carbon Dioxide Hits a Level Not Seen for 3 Million Years. Here’s What That Means for
Climate Change—and Humanity, NBC NEWS: ENV’T (May 14, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/
mach/science/carbon-dioxide-hits-level-not-seen-3-million-years-here-ncna1005231 [https://
perma.cc/WC2P-ZP39]; Global Carbon Dioxide Levels Measured Atop Mauna Loa Set
a New Monthly Record, HAWAII NEWS NOW (Mar. 7, 2019), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.
com/2019/03/07/global-carbon-dioxide-levels-measured-atop-mauna-loa-set-new-record/
[https:// perma.cc/8AH4-NCR8].
2. The goal of “energy dominance” pushed by the current Administration includes
numerous activities to encourage or subsidize fossil fuels, such as drilling for oil and gas on
public lands. Cooper McKim, Trump Push for ‘Energy Dominance’ Boosts Drilling on Public
Land, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/25/666373189/ 
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will need to deal with fossil fuels—specifically how such future governments 
must leave fossil fuels in the ground if our society hopes to avoid catastrophic
climate change.3 
One of the largest obstacles governments face when deciding whether 
to leave fossil fuels in the ground is the threat of massive takings liability,
as takings claims will likely be used to challenge any government attempts
to slow or prevent the extraction of fossil fuels. This has been particularly 
relevant in the ongoing debates over fracking, which has enabled a boom 
in oil and gas production in the United States.4 Takings liability is the 
boogeyman that state and local regulators see around every corner.5 
Moreover, lobbyists for the oil and gas industry raise the specter of takings 
liability to oppose even the most modest regulatory proposals which in
any way appear to affect their bottom line.6 However, the fear of takings 
liability is misplaced.7 
The current and future threats society faces by unchecked fossil fuel
development create ample room for governments to regulate or even ban 
trump-push-for-energy-dominance-boosts-drilling-on-public-land [https://perma.cc/4PG9- 
CT2Q].
3. The latest scientific goal is to limit greenhouse gas emissions in order to keep the 
global temperature increase  to 1.5 degrees Celsius  or  less. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ [https:// 
perma.cc/F3E4-TUR4] (last visited Apr. 30, 2019) [hereinafter IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING 
OF 1.5°C]. 
4. The fracking boom has increased production of oil and gas in the U.S. so much that
it has regained the status of the top producer in the world. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil Producer (Sept. 12, 
2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053 [https://perma.cc/3T2R-
DS7G].  
 5.  See John D. Echeverria & Thekla Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings 
Legislation: Lessons from Democracy’s Laboratories, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 500 (2009) 
(noting the phenomenon of “regulatory retreat” that occurred after Florida and Oregon 
expanded takings liability in their states).
6. For example, Colorado voters considered a ballot measure in 2018 that would 
have modestly increased setbacks for oil and gas development from homes, schools, and
other important areas to 2500 feet. Industry claimed that enormous takings liability would 
follow if this law passed. Luane Kadlub, Colorado Alliance of Mineral and Royalty
Owners Says State Could Be on the Hook for $26 Billion if Oil and Gas Setbacks Increase, 
GREELEY TRIBUNE (June 12, 2018), https://www.greeleytribune.com/news/business/colorado-
alliance- of-mineral-and-royalty-owners-says-state-could-be-on-hook-for-26-billion-if-oil-
and-gas- setbacks-increase/ [https://perma.cc/A9P9-M8QN]. The ballot measure failed, 
likely due at least in part to these threats and the enormous amount of money spent by the
industry on attack ads. See Jacy Marmaduke, Proposition 112 Failed. What’s Next for Oil
and Gas Setbacks?, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.coloradoan. 
com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/06/colorado-election-proposition-112-fails-oil-
gas-setbacks/1893643002/ [https://perma.cc/YT68-DBGN] (noting industry-backed groups spent 
$36 million opposing the measure). 
 7.  See Kevin J. Lynch, Regulation of Fracking Is Not a Taking of Private Property, 
84 U. CIN. L. REV. 38, 42–46 (2016). 
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the extraction of fossil fuels as part of their obligations under the public
trust doctrine. Traditionally, the public trust doctrine developed to protect 
common resources such as navigable rivers.8 In modern times, however,
the doctrine has expanded to other trust resources, such as the atmosphere.9 
Thus, the public trust doctrine acts as a background principle of law that
insulates regulation of fracking from takings liability—even for total
takings under Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council.10 This Article explores the
application of the public trust doctrine to fracking, specifically as it relates 
to regulations designed to prevent harms of continued greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions as a result of the extraction and burning of fossil fuels. 
II. FRACKING AND ITS IMPACTS
Fracking is the current shorthand for the oil and gas industry,11 but it
specifically refers to the process known as high volume hydraulic fracturing. 
Although hydraulic fracturing has been used for many years,12 technological 
breakthroughs in the past ten to twenty years have enabled extraction of 
oil and gas from rock formations that were previously inaccessible.13  Current
 8.  See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455–56 (1892) (“[P]roperty is 
held by the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public. The ownership of the
navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public concern
to the whole people of the State. The trust with which they are held, therefore, is 
governmental and cannot be alienated, except in those instances mentioned of parcels used 
in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of without 
detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining”).
9. Mary C. Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Across the World, FIDUCIARY
DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 7 (Ken Cogill et al. eds., 2012), available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1945562 [https://perma.cc/4PYD-KKVL].
10. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
11. Although fracking and oil and gas development are not formally synonymous, 
in common practice they are often used interchangeably. This article intentionally uses 
“fracking” in its broader sense, both for readability purposes and because the term helps
convey crude thoughts using acceptable language in a formal publication. Thus, the phrase 
“fracking the public trust” is intended to convey frustration and some unpleasant connotations, 
just as the Battlestar Galactica franchise used “frak” as a stand-in for another four-letter 
word. See Chris Talbott, What the ‘Frak’? Faux Curse Seeping Into Language, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 2, 2008), https://tucson.com/news/what-the-frak-faux-curse-seeping-into-language/
article_b5eeb180-8124-5516-8851-79eef2b5aca1.html [https://perma.cc/SLX2-D9FJ].
12. Fracking can be traced back at least to the 1940s. E.g., Hannah Wiseman, Untested 
Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit 
Regulation, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 115 (2009). 
13. For a more detailed discussion of the development of fracking, see Lynch, 
Regulation of Fracking, supra note 7; Kevin J. Lynch, A Fracking Mess: Just Compensation
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fracking practices rely on the ability to drill directionally and horizontally 
so that a well may pass for many miles through a narrow band of rock that
has relatively low porosity.14 Fracking involves the underground injection
of water, sand, and chemicals which are then used to break apart the rock 
formation so that oil and gas can flow into the well along the horizontal 
length.15 This action dramatically increases the amount of oil and gas that
can be recovered, which is necessary to offset the tremendous cost of drilling 
horizontally and the fracking process itself.16 
These modernized developments in technology and application have 
greatly changed and intensified the impacts of fracking on the surrounding
community, and this is of particular concern when it occurs near populated
areas. Our understanding of the public health impacts of such pollution 
and industrial disturbance has also grown.17 However, researchers and 
policymakers have struggled to keep up with the rapid developments and 
a constantly evolving industry. Additionally, as the understanding of the
climate change impacts has increased, it is clear that the burning of fossil 
fuels, such as oil and natural gas, has become more concerning.18 
Considering local impacts, it is important to note that fracking is an 
industrial activity that would otherwise be considered out of place in 
residential and commercial areas. However, in many states, oil and gas
development is allowed even in these areas in spite of any local zoning laws 
that would otherwise prohibit industrial activity near homes, schools, parks, 
shopping centers, and other places where people spend much of their 
time. Yet fracking operations pose serious risks to safety and health due to 
the inherent risk of explosions and spills. Aside from accidents, fracking
for Regulatory Takings of Oil and Gas Property Rights, 43 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 335, 
344–48 (2018).
14. David Blackmon, Horizontal Drilling: A Technological Marvel Ignored, FORBES
(Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2013/01/28/horizontal-
drilling-a-technological-marvel-ignored/#1c3b99926f11 [https://perma.cc/7N8M-DTPA] 
(discussing the interplay between horizontal drilling and fracking which opened up oil and 
gas reserves previously inaccessible).
15. Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 12. 
16. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TRENDS IN U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS UPSTREAM
COSTS 2 (Mar. 2016), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VK2P-XZMC] (finding costs of wells ranging from $4.9 million to $8.3 million, most
of which is due to completion or fracking).
17. See FOOD AND WATER WATCH, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF FRACKING: A PENNSYLVANIA
Case Study (Sept. 2013), https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/Social% 
20Costs%20Fracking%20Report%20Sept%202013_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q33-SX3K]
(providing an early look at the social impacts of fracking).
18. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 11 (2013)
(noting fossil fuels as the primary source of climate change emissions) [hereinafter IPCC, FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT].
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operations impose many externalities on their neighbors in the form of noise,19 
light pollution, heavy truck traffic, and air pollution.20 These demonstrated 
harms and other risks and uncertainties have led some jurisdictions to ban 
fracking outright.21  However, other jurisdictions struggle to respond to public
concerns while simultaneously enabling oil and gas development in urbanized 
areas.22 
Fracking also has concerning regional impacts, primarily those related 
to air pollution and the use and contamination of water supplies. Fracking 
emits many ozone precursors, particularly volatile organic compounds,
which are significant contributors to smog problems in some urban areas.23 
19. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Richburg & Jeremy Slagley, Noise Concerns of Residents
Living in Close Proximity to Hydraulic Fracturing Sites in Southwest Pennsylvania, 36
PUB. HEALTH NURSING 3 (2019).
20. See, e.g., Lisa M. McKenzie et al., Relationships Between Indicators of
Cardiovascular Disease and Intensity of Oil and Natural Gas Activity in Northeastern 
Colorado, 170 ENVTL. RES. 56 (2019) (noting the relationship between individuals with
heart disease and their proximity to oil and gas development, due to environmental stressors
such as air pollution or noise). 
21.   N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY 
PROGRAM: FINDINGS STATEMENT 34–41 (2015).
22. This tension is apparent in the ongoing conflict between industry and the public 
in Colorado. As the oil and gas industry began encroaching on densely populated areas of
the Northern Front Range, several local governments responded with attempts to ban or 
regulate oil and gas, most notably the cities of Longmont and Fort Collins. These attempts
were met with resistance from the state and oil and gas industries, all of whom convinced 
the state supreme court to declare that Colorado had an interest in fracking sufficient to
preempt local bans or moratoria. See Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 
580 (2016). The fight over fracking then shifted to the state’s agency and legislature. For
example, following public outcry over the approval of many oil and gas wells in close
proximity to schools, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission updated its 
rules to revise setbacks required between the wells and school properties—the revised 
rules now require the distances be measured from the school’s property line rather than 
the school building. See  COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, SCHOOL SETBACK 
RULEMAKING, https://cogcc.state.co.us/reg.html#/rules/schoolsetbackrulemaking [https://perma.cc/
W665-Z6VY] (last visited Apr. 30, 2019). Colorado’s Governor recently signed legislation
that will place greater emphasis on protection of public health and safety while explicitly 
allowing more local regulation of oil and gas. See S.B. 19-181 Reg. Sess. (Co. 2019). Still, 
Colorado’s legislature has refused to go so far as to ban fracking out of concern over local,
regional, or global climate impacts.
23. Oil and gas are big contributors to violations of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standard for ozone in the Denver region. Jason M. Evans & Detlev Helmig,
Investigation of the Influence of Transport from Oil and Natural Gas Regions on Elevated Ozone
Levels in the Northern Colorado Front Range, 67:2 J. OF  AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N
196–211 (2017). See also Erin E. McDuffie, et al., Influence of Oil and Gas Emissions on
 73  





       
   
   
  
    
   
        
 
    
   
       
 
   
    
 
  
   




       
    
 
         
    
    
 
      
       
   
    
      
    
 
      
     
    
 
 
      
  
  
Thus, even if oil and gas operations are located far enough away from 
people to avoid acute local impacts, pollution from the industry nevertheless 
contributes significantly to unhealthy air in some regions. Fracking also
involves significant use of water, which is of short supply in many places
in the Western United States.24 Furthermore, unlike other uses such as
agriculture,25 water that is used in fracking is often contaminated either 
with chemicals from the fracking process itself or from other chemicals
released from the ground, making it unsuitable for returning to water sources 
and put to other uses.26 Thus, particularly in the arid West, fracking is a threat
to fresh water supplies found in rivers, lakes, and reservoirs.
Finally, fracking has allowed access to oil and gas resources that were 
uneconomical to extract until recently, resulting in production of oil and gas 
that were previously kept safely in the ground. This means fossil fuels are
more plentiful and therefore inexpensive, which further promotes their
continued use so long as regulators continue not to price or tax carbon
emissions.27 As a result, the oil and gas industry continues to receive massive
publicly-funded subsidies while regulatory authorities permit waste from 
oil and gas to be dumped into the atmosphere at no cost to the industry.28 
Such actions—or rather, inactions—necessarily increase the levels of carbon 
dioxide and other GHGs in our atmosphere.29 This not only causes but 
Summertime Ozone in the Colorado Northern Front Range, 121:14 J. OF  GEOPHYSICAL 
RES.: ATMOSPHERES 8712–29 (July 2016). 
24. Andrew J. Kondash et al., The Intensification of the Water Footprint of Hydraulic 
Fracturing, 4 SCI. ADV. 1, 4 (Aug. 15, 2018) (noting that concern over water use “is especially
high in semiarid regions”). 
25. Agricultural uses of water have significant return flows and thereby potential 
for reuse of water supplies. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AG., AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, ch. 2.2 at 1, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/
41964/30287_irrigationwater.pdf?v=0 [https://perma.cc/BG7K-MU5H].
26. Kondash, supra note 24, at 1 (“The wastewater generated from hydraulic fracturing
is composed of a blend of returned injected hydraulic fracturing water and typically high
saline formation water that flows back out of the well . . . .”). 
27. The idea that fossil fuel extraction and use thereof should account for the economic
costs it imposes on society is known as the “social cost of carbon”. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, 
The True Cost of Carbon Pollution (2017), https://www.edf.org/true-cost-carbon-pollution
[https://perma.cc/VP7D-FSLM].
28. Other than the limited number of jurisdictions that implemented a carbon tax or 
a cap-and-trade program, most fossil fuels do not pay for the costs, i.e., externalities, that 
they impose on society. See, e.g., B.C. GOV’T, BRITISH COLUMBIA’S CARBON TAX, https://
www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/climate-change/planning-and-action/carbon-tax
[https://perma.cc/4L8E-MQPW].
29. E. G. Nisbet et al., Very Strong Atmospheric Methane Growth in the 4 Years 
2014-2017: Implications for the Paris Agreement, 33 GLOB. BIOGEOCHEMICAL CYCLES 1
(2019) (noting a recent spike in methane levels in the atmosphere). 
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accelerates climate change, which impacts public health,30 wildlife,31 rivers,32 
and oceans.33 Although natural gas in particular is sometimes seen as a 
bridge fuel to wean the world off of coal usage, its benefits as a potential 
bridge fuel are contingent upon little to no leakage of natural gas,34 which
is principally composed of methane, a potent GHG. Unfortunately, studies 
of natural gas leakage rates demonstrate that leakage is higher than industry
and government estimates and may negatively offset much, if not all, of the 
benefits of switching from coal to natural gas.35 
Methane leakage aside, fracking provides access to ever more reserves 
of both oil and natural gas. Consequently, it has accelerated the rate at
which humanity burns through its “carbon budget”—the amount of fossil
fuels that can be burned without causing unacceptable levels of climate 
change.36 The “carbon budget” concept means that some oil and gas (as 
well as coal and other fossil fuels) must inevitably be left in the ground if 
we are to have any hope of retaining a global climate that is not radically 
different from the one of recent centuries. Thus, more states and national 
governments should follow the lead of New York and other jurisdictions 
30. IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 3, at 11, B.5.1-5.2 (2018)
(noting health impacts especially in vulnerable populations).
31. See id. at 10, B.3.1 (discussing impacts on species loss and extinction). 
32. Among the impacts on land use, increased droughts and floods are predicted 
even at the most ambitious targets for mitigating climate change. IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING 
OF 1.5°C, supra note 3, at 9, B.1.3 (2018). These increasing droughts and floods will have 
dramatic impacts on rivers and other navigable bodies of freshwater. 
33. See id. at 9, B.2; 10, B.4 (2018). 
34. Unfortunately, the oil and gas industry and its allies in the current federal
administration have been weakening federal rules designed to reduce methane leakage
from oil and gas, at precisely the time when stronger rules and enforcement are needed.
See Marianne Lavelle, Trump Targets Obama’s Methane Rules in Latest Climate Policy 
Rollbacks, INSIDECLIMATENEWS (Sept. 18, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/11092018/
methane-flaring-rules-oil-gas-industry-climate-change-obama-trump-epa-rollback [https:// 
perma.cc/2S2Y-A47U] (discussing how proposed changes to Obama-era climate policies
will save the oil and gas industry money but with costs to public health resulting from increased 
emissions ). 
35. See, e.g., Ramon A. Alvarez et al., Assessment of Methane Emissions from the U.S.
Oil and Gas Supply Chain, 361 SCI. 186 (2018) (indicating that actual emission are 60 percent 
higher than federal government estimates).
36. Kelly Levin, According to New IPCC Report, the World is on Track to Exceed 
Its “Carbon Budget” in 12 Years, WORLD RES. INST. (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.wri.org/
blog/2018/10/according-new-ipcc-report-world-track-exceed-its-carbon-budget-12-years 
[https://perma.cc/E7U5-HVE2]. 
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that ban fracking outright.37 Alternatively, states and national governments
should impose a price on carbon emissions through either market-based
systems like cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, or they may find another way
to wean society off its addiction to fossil fuels and hasten the deployment 
of renewable energy sources. With these concerns in mind, this Article 
explores the public trust doctrine for use as both a sword and a shield to 
compel government to act when political dynamics are resistant or otherwise 
not up to the challenge. This Article further discusses how the public trust
doctrine may be utilized to defend against the inevitable backlash from 
entrenched fossil fuel interests, with emphasis on takings claims when
government regulations cause oil and gas to be left in the ground.
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine broadly reflects the principle that the government 
acts as a trustee over certain key resources, with the public and future
generations as the beneficiaries of the trust.38 The doctrine includes both 
a negative component—restricting the government from harming or alienating 
public resources in a way that is detrimental to impacts on the public—and a
positive component—creating duties and obligations in the government 
to affirmatively manage and protect trust resources for the public. This
section briefly covers the historical development of the public trust doctrine,
from its ancient roots through its introduction and development in American
law. This section also explores the key question regarding which resources
are included in the public trust, and, finally, it notes some recent developments
that have the potential to strengthen the role of the public trust doctrine 
with respect to fracking. 
The public trust doctrine traces its origins to ancient Roman times and 
was codified in the Justinian code as, “[t]hus, the following things are by 
natural law common to all—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently
the sea-shore.”39 The idea that government had trust obligations over important
common natural resources continued through English law and was then 
adopted by various American jurisdictions as well.  Thus, New Jersey courts 
recognized the state could not divest the public of its right to access public 
resources.40 The public trust doctrine was also recognized by the United
37. E.g., Thomas Kaplan, Citing Health Risks, Cuomo Bans Fracking in New York 
State, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/nyregion/cuomo-
to-ban-fracking-in-new-york-state-citing-health-risks.html [https://perma.cc/59DV-F4XP].
38. E.g., Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past 
& Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665 (2012). 
39. EMPEROR CAESAR FLAVIUS JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (J.B.  
Moyle trans. Oxford 1911). 
40. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J. L. 1, 78 (1821). 
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States Supreme Court when it held, “the shores, the rivers, and bays, and 
arms of the sea, and the land under them . . . [are] held as a public trust for
the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all for navigation 
and fishery.”41 The public trust in Martin was recognized as an important
aspect of the sovereignty.42 These same principles apply to the other states 
according to the equal-footing doctrine.43 
The most important early statement from the Supreme Court regarding
the public trust doctrine is found in the Court’s decision in Illinois Central.44 
The case involved a claim of title by a private railroad company to lands 
that the state claimed ownership in as a public trust resource.45 This Court’s
opinion explained the limitations on government’s ability to alienate public
trust resources, which was permitted only if the alienation would promote
public interests in the transferred land or if it would not substantially impair 
the public’s interest in the remaining public trust resources.46  The Illinois
Central decision also noted some ways the American public trust doctrine 
diverged from the laws in England, specifically because the United States
contains many navigable waterways that are not subject to the tides, including
not only rivers but also the Great Lakes.47  Thus, the Supreme Court has
recognized the adaptability and flexibility of the doctrine in that it evolves 
when applied in new contexts.48 
Several state courts have developed the public trust doctrine even further 
than their federal counterparts. For example, Pennsylvania includes the 
public trust doctrine in its state constitution and has held that it applies, “not
only to state owned lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but also resources
41. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 411–16 (1842). 
42. Id. at 409–10. 
43. See, e.g., PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 590–91 (2012)
(discussing the equal-footing doctrine under which “the people of each State, based on
principles of sovereignty, ‘hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils
under them,’ subject only to rights surrendered and powers granted by the Constitution to 
the Federal Government . . . under which a State’s title to these lands was ‘conferred not 
by Congress but by the Constitution itself.’”). 
44. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
45. Id. at 433–34. 
46. Id. at 453. 
47. Id. at 435–36. 
48. This notion applies to both federal and state courts, as both have recognized the 
flexibility of the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 
1971). See also Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 955 (Pa. 2013) (noting the 
unqualified term “public natural resources” applies broadly and “is amenable to change over
time to conform, for example, with the development of related legal and societal concerns.”). 
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that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface and groundwater, 
wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are outside the scope of purely
private property.”49 California also took an expansive view of the rights
protected by the public trust doctrine in the famous Mono Lake case 
wherein the California Supreme Court held the doctrine protected areas
for not only traditional navigation, commerce, and fisheries, but also other 
important public uses such as preservation of lands in their natural state 
for scientific study, open space, scenery, climate purposes, and as habitat 
for wildlife.50 And, of course, the aforementioned oldest codification of
the public trust doctrine was not limited to navigable waters and tidelands; 
it also included the air as an important component of the public trust.51 
Thus, although some argue for less reliance on an expansive public trust
doctrine, there is ample support from both caselaw and scholars that the 
public trust doctrine should have a broad and flexible application to protect 
the public interest in key common resources such as water, public lands, 
and the air we all breathe.52 
Finally, state and federal courts also commonly recognize a public trust
in wildlife.53 The United States Supreme Court recently recognized state 
authority over wildlife in a takings case, in which it distinguished a case where
a taking was found to occur when oysters were harvested from beds of a 
state waterway from a case involving raisins, which are “the fruit of the 
growers’ labor”—the latter were not ferae naturae over which the state had 
sovereign authority.54 State courts have similarly recognized state ownership
49.  Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955. 
50. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d at 380.
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
52. See, e.g., Mary C. Wood & Charles W. Woodword, Atmospheric Trust Litigation 
Across the World, 6 WASH J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 633, 654 (2012); Michael C. Blumm &
Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 42–54 (2017); Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 465– 
70 (1989); Kevin J. Lynch, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Modern Fisheries
Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 291–304 (2007). 
53. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 
352-54 (2005) (collecting cases dealing with the wildlife trust); Mary Christina Wood,
Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species 
Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605, 609 n.18 (2004) (collecting other cases dealing with the wildlife
trust).
54. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015) (citing Leonard &
Leonard v. Earle, 279 U.S. 392 (1929)). See also John D. Echeverria & Michael C. Blumm,
Horne v. Department of Agriculture: Expanding Per Se Takings While Endorsing State
Sovereign Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L. REV. 657 (2016). 
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of wildlife resources.55 State ownership of wildlife has also been recognized
in state court as a defense to takings claims related to regulations to protect 
wildlife and endangered species.56 
Thus, the core of the public trust doctrine has been recognized repeatedly 
by United States courts and applies, at minimum, to navigable and tidal 
waters and the submerged lands beneath them. The trust serves to protect 
public interests in navigation, fishing, and commerce. A more expansive 
view of the public trust doctrine includes protection of other resources like
air and wildlife, as well as additional uses like recreation and environmental 
protection.57  Sovereigns—state and/or federal governments—are thus 
prohibited from using or disposing of public trust resources in a way that
harms public interests. Further, such sovereigns also have an affirmative 
duty to protect public trust resources for the benefit of the public, the 
beneficiaries of the public trust. 
Recent developments have the potential to advance public trust obligations
in the climate change arena. Most prominent among these developments
concerns pending litigation in federal district court in Oregon: the Juliana
case.58 Plaintiffs in Juliana include numerous youths who seek to compel 
the government to develop a comprehensive response to the climate change
crisis, including a plan to reduce GHG emissions. The case is part of a growing 
movement of atmospheric trust litigation,59 and it is being litigated by a
non-profit organization called Our Children’s Trust.60 
The Juliana plaintiffs received a remarkable victory in 2016 when Judge
Aiken of Oregon District Court denied motions to dismiss filed by the 
government and industry intervenors, effectively setting the stage for discovery
55. Fields v. Wilson, 207 P.2d 153, 156 (Or. 1949); DALE GOBLE AND ERIC T.
FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 381 (2002) (discussing state ownership of
wildlife in all states).
56. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321,
353 (2005) (discussing cases in New York and California); for further discussion of the 
public trust as a defense against takings claims, see supra Section III. 
57. See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text. 
58. See Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate 
Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017) (Detailed 
background of the Juliana case).
59. Id. at 21. 
60. Id. at 21. See also, JULIANA V. UNITED STATES: YOUTH CLIMATE LAWSUIT, OUR
CHILD. TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us [https://perma.cc/SY44-MD75]. 
Earth Guardians, a non-profit organization based in Boulder Colorado, is also an organization 
Plaintiff in the Juliana case. Id.
 79  
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and trial proceedings to begin.61 Judge Aiken determined plaintiffs “adequately
alleged infringement of a fundamental right” in their pleadings, such that 
the case should move forward to trial.62  The opinion specifically referenced
plaintiffs’ fundamental right to a climate system capable of sustaining human
life, recognition of which allows plaintiffs to proceed with their substantive
due process claims against the government. Judge Aiken rejected claims
by the government and industry intervenors that the plaintiffs suit rested
on the notion that they have a right to be free from any pollution or climate 
change whatsoever, which they argued would open the floodgates to potential 
litigation against government action that in any way endangered the public.63 
Ultimately, Judge Aiken found that the lawsuit must proceed because, “[t]o
hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords no protection 
against a government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens breathe 
or the water its citizens drink.”64  I could not agree more. 
Although the case was set for trial commencing on October 29, 2018,65 
the case was stayed in December 2018 as the Ninth Circuit considers the 
federal government’s latest request to avoid trial.66 The government’s attempts 
to avoid facing the youth in court lack sufficient merit, yet the Supreme
Court has hinted that it might intervene to stop the trial, which would be 
61. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1252–53 (D. Or. 2016). 
62. Id. at 1250. 
63. Id. at 1250, 1252. This is not to minimize concerns over the expansive 
application of the public trust doctrine such that it would swallow all of the law. Even
those who are very sympathetic to the urgency of addressing climate change may not agree 
that public trust litigation is the best means of meeting the challenge. See, e.g., Richard J. 
Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Can 
Two Wrongs Make It Right?, 45 ENVTL. L. 1139, 1152 (2015) (“. . . [I]t is a serious mistake
to take the public trust doctrine far beyond its historic moorings.”). However, while I
agree it would be best if political forces sufficiently motivated our elected officials to
adequately respond to the threat of climate change, this simply has not occurred, and each
day we grow closer to the necessary timescale. Thus, I strongly support any and all efforts 
to not only compel the needed action from our government(s), but also to overcome the 
entrenched and powerful interests of the fossil fuel industry and its government-associated 
enablers. The continued attempts by government and industry to avoid facing the youths
in court is yet another instance of delay and avoidance leading us down a very dangerous
path of climate disruption. 
64. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250. 
65. Press Release: Thousands Rally in Support of the Young Americans Behind
Juliana v. United States on Monday, OUR CHILD. TRUST (Oct. 25, 2018), https://static1.square
space.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5bd286c44785d33e125cbdff/154052371
7271/2018.10.25+Media+Advisory+for+Oct+29.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5RN-BSD3].
66. See Press Release: Youth Plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States Ask Ninth Circuit 
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an unfortunate development.67 The Court should resist the urge to halt
this important case and stunt development of the public trust doctrine simply
because a majority of the justices wish to avoid the current political dispute 
over whether our society should address the obvious hurdles posed by 
climate change and the continued reliance on fossil fuels. 
IV. TAKINGS LAW AND BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
Although takings law is notoriously complicated, this Article focuses on 
just one aspect of that law: the “background principles” defense to takings 
claims. The United States Supreme Court laid out the modern conception 
of this defense in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.68 However, 
this doctrine is less of a defense of government action against takings claims 
and more of an elaboration on the idea that a vested property right is a 
precondition for a plaintiff’s successful takings claim.69 The “background
principles” defense previously received little attention because prior takings
cases recognized that regulations designed to prevent harm, implemented
under the authority of police powers, were generally immune to takings
claims.70 In the 1990s, however, the new conservative majority on the 
Supreme Court expanded takings liability by creating a per se takings rule 
for regulations that reduce the value of property to zero.71 In doing so, 
private property owners no longer had a vested right to use their property
however they saw fit. Instead, where “background principles of the [s]tate’s
law of property and nuisance” place restrictions on the use of private 
property,72 then a regulation which merely enforces that restriction is not 
67. See Order Denying Gov’t Petition to Stay Proceedings Without Prejudice, 586
-U.S. __ (2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/18A410-In-Re
United-States-Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4YA-NHKX].  Although two Justices provided they
would grant the requested Stay, the remaining Justices said they would not because the
Ninth Circuit may still act on the case, so an extraordinary writ may not be appropriate as 
“adequate relief” may be obtained from another Court.  See id. (citing S. Ct. Rule 20.1).
68. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992).
69. John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense 
in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 944 (2012). 
70.  Id.
71. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992). Although this 
new per se rule was initially thought (and in some quarters, feared) to create a radical change in
takings liability for government land use regulations, in practice, it has a very mild and
limited effect.
72. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
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subject to liability or challenge as a taking.73 The question then becomes: 
what counts as a background principle of law as part of the takings analysis?
Nuisances are the most obvious example of activities which private property 
owners may be prohibited from engaging in without the requirement of 
just compensation from the government.74 And fracking operations can 
certainly rise to the level of a nuisance.75 However, background principles
go beyond merely nuisance and do not necessarily result in prohibition of 
the activity being regulated.76 Thus, courts have applied the Lucas background
principles defense in many different contexts including the natural use doctrine,
the federal navigational servitude, customary rights like native gathering 
rights, water rights, the trust obligations with respect to wildlife, Indian treaty
rights, and—most importantly for this Article—the public trust doctrine.77 
Though each of these legal doctrines are important, and many of them might 
apply in the context of fracking, this Article focuses solely on the public
trust doctrine as a defense. 
Scholars disagree somewhat about the precise scope of the public trust 
doctrine and when it should be used in litigation, but there appears to be a
73. See id. at 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically 
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed  use  
interests were not part of his title to begin with.”).
74. E.g., id. at 1022 (citing Supreme Court case law, “sustaining against Due 
Process and Takings Clause challenges the State’s use of its “police powers” to enjoin a 
property owner from activities akin to public nuisances . . . [including] Mugler v. Kansas, 
123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian,
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent 
infection of nearby orchards); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effectively 
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law barring operation of brick mill in residential area); 
preventing continued operation of quarry in residential area).”). 
75. After a jury found that intense industrial fracking operations created a private
nuisance, the Texas Court of Appeals overturned that verdict because the company did not 
intend to cause a nuisance. Aruba Petrol. Inc. v. Parr, No. 05-14-01285-CV, 2017 Tex.
App. LEXIS 873 (2017). Some side effects of fracking that create nuisance effects for the 
surrounding area include noise and light pollution, air emissions, truck traffic, and the risk 
of spills and contamination of land and water. Contra Kevin J. Lynch, Regulation of
Fracking, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing fracking as a nuisance).  See also Hilary M. Goldberg
et al., It’s a Nuisance: The Future of Fracking Litigation in the Wake of Parr v. Aruba
Petroleum, Inc., 33 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2015). 
76. See John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles
Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 949 (2012) (discussing American 
Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1366–69 (Fed. Cir. 2004), wherein 
the court rejected claimants challenge to Congressional legislation that revoked a previously- 
acquired fishing permit as a an unconstitutional taking, because, among other reasons, the 
background principle of sovereign control over the coastal Exclusive Economic Zone
precluded claimant’s entitlement claim without making the conduct unlawful).
77. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background 
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 341–54 (2005). 
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baseline consensus that the doctrine is an available and appropriate defense
under the background principles doctrine in takings litigation.  For example,
Professor Richard Lazarus has some continuing concerns about broad usage 
of the public trust to address urgent environmental issues such as climate
change. Nevertheless, he agrees the public trust doctrine is an appropriate 
response to the Supreme Court’s expansion of takings jurisprudence in
recent years.78 Although Professor Lazarus would likely object to broad 
readings or expansions of the public trust doctrine in the takings context, 
he nonetheless thinks it as a useful defense to regulatory takings claims 
where “the doctrine can fairly be said to apply.”79 Thus, even though Professor
Lazarus has been vocal about his concerns regarding the public trust doctrine, 
the background principles defense to takings is the one change in position 
he has made over the years regarding his views on the doctrine.
Other leading scholars similarly recognize the importance of the public 
trust doctrine in takings law. Professor John Echeverria, a leading experts 
on takings law, has advocated forcefully for use of the doctrine in defense
to takings claims related to water use restrictions designed to protect fish 
and other public trust resources.80 Although federal cases that prompted 
Echeverria’s attention did not recognize the public trust doctrine as a defense,
and ultimately were decided on other grounds, namely ripeness,81 there
remain good reasons for recognizing the public trust doctrine as a takings 
defense. In fact, other cases have done just that—affirmatively recognizing
the public trust as a defense against government liability.82 
Finally, some scholars and courts took a more expansive view of the  
public trust doctrine.  Such views applied the doctrine beyond the core of 
78. Richard J. Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Can Two Wrongs Make It Right?, 45 ENVTL. L. 1139, 1149 (2015). However, 
Professor Lazarus has some concerns about broad usage of the public trust doctrine to
address urgent environmental issues such as climate change. See id.
79. Id. This narrow view towards the appropriate utility of the public trust doctrine 
has been critiqued by others. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Two Wrongs? Correcting Professor 
Lazarus’s Misunderstanding of the Public Trust Doctrine, 46 ENVTL. L. 481 (2016). 
80. John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles
Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 955 (2012) (“. . . courts should 
readily acknowledge that the public trust doctrine provides a background principles defense to
a takings claim based on regulatory restrictions on the use of water designed to protect fish 
or other trust resources from harm.”).
81. E.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. U.S., 708 F.3d 1340, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(providing that issues of ripeness ultimately decided the case). 
82. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985–87 (9th
Cir. 2002); R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Wis. 2001). 
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navigable waterways and the submerged lands beneath them or subject to
the tide. Professor Michael Blumm, for example, developed the preeminent 
theory wherein a broader view of the doctrine related to the background
principles defenses.83 Professor Blumm collected numerous cases supporting
expansive use of the public trust doctrine in this context.84 Accordingly,
states retain authority to extend the reach of their respective public trusts, 
just as California, New Jersey, and other states already have.85  Although
some commentators objected to such broad applications of the public trust 
doctrine as background principles defenses,86 nothing in Lucas required
reliance on static background principles of law that would not evolve over
time.87  Legal systems of property rights must constantly change to adapt 
to ongoing developments in both the world and human understanding.88 
It follows that abrupt and continuing changes induced by fracking and our
growing understanding of its impact on public health, safety, and the 
environment (particularly the atmosphere and general climate) have thus 
led to changes in property rights and regulations of private property. Such
changes are likely to increase going forward. I generally share the view
that an expansive public trust doctrine is both a necessary and appropriate 
legal tool to address the impacts of fracking, particularly its contribution 
to climate change. Thus, the following section analyzes how the public 
trust doctrine can and should operate as a defense to takings claims. 
V. FRACKING THE PUBLIC TRUST
The key question remains: What are the implications of applying the  
public trust doctrine to fracking? This section compares impacts of fracking 
83. Blumm is not alone in this view, as other leading scholars have recognized the 
potential for the public trust doctrine to defend against takings claims in a broader context. 
See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Has the Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings 
Jurisprudence: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council on Wetlands and Costal
Barrier Breaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995). 
84. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise
of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 
341–54 (2005) (citing numerous cases supporting application of the public trust doctrine 
in the realm of background principles like the natural use doctrine, navigational servitudes,
customary rights (e.g., indigenous gathering rights), water rights, Indian treaty rights, and
the wildlife trust context).
85. Id. at 343. 
86. Id. at 343 n.138 (collecting articles critical of broad public trust defenses to takings).
87. Michael C. Blumm, Two Wrongs? Correcting Professor Lazarus’s Misunderstanding 
of the Public Trust Doctrine, 46 ENVTL. L. 481, 485–86 (2016) (discussing the “nonstatic 
nature” of the background principles defense). 
88. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19J.LAND USE&ENVTL.L. 1, 3–4 (2003)
(explaining that regulatory takings claims are “fundamentally conflicts over legal transitions” 
but also that “change is inevitable and necessary.”).
84
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to the resources and uses protected by the public trust doctrine, noting
many areas of overlap in both the traditional and expansive views of the
doctrine. This section also specifically focuses on use of the public trust 
doctrine as a defense to takings claims based on legal restrictions on fracking— 
both on existing law and potential future laws arguably necessary to adequately
address climate change. Finally, this section examines the affirmative obligations
on state and federal governments to protect public trust resources from 
unacceptable impacts due to fracking.   
Fracking impacts many resources and uses thereof that are protected by 
as part of the public trust. As discussed previously,89 fracking affects traditional 
public trust resources including rivers and other navigable waters, oceans,
and shorelines. For example, draining dry western rivers to enable fracking
has impacts on navigable waterways used for commerce and fishing.90 
Offshore oil and gas development impacts trust resources in the territorial 
sea controlled by states or in federal waters, going out as far as the Exclusive 
Economic Zone 200 miles offshore.91 Spills can also contaminate rivers, lakes, 
and other navigable waters. These are all direct impacts of fracking on public 
trust resources, even in the most narrow and constrained form of the public 
trust doctrine. However, these impacts occur only when fracking operations
are located near or in these waterways, so not all fracking would be implicated 
in this context. 
However, the analysis need not be expanded much to include other indirect
impacts of fracking, especially those related to climate change. Even under 
the assumption that the air or atmosphere is not within the public trust,
climate change caused by unchecked fossil fuel emissions have numerous 
impacts on other trust resources, including the ocean, rivers and lakes, or
wildlife. Carbon dioxide pollution, in particular, is causing ocean acidification,92 
which impacts corals, fish, and other marine species that are essential for 
healthy functioning ocean ecosystems.  Warming ocean and fresh water also 
similarly impact aquatic wildlife that is traditionally managed by states in
89. See supra Section I. 
90. See Matt Stensland, Stretch of Yampa River Closed to Fishing Due to Water 
Flow, ASPEN TIMES (June 12, 2018), https://www.aspentimes.com/news/stretch-of-yampa-
river-closed-to-fishing-due-to-low-water-flow/ [https://perma.cc/R9V9-FJZ6]. 
91. See generally ADAM VANN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL33404, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS 
DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33404.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/AAS5-5X6J].
92. IPCC, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 18, at 15. 
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trust for the public.93 Even terrestrial wildlife will be affected by changing 
precipitation patterns, drought, increased prevalence of extreme heat, and 
other impacts attributable to climate change.94 
Indirect effects on navigable waters and wildlife aside, the most analytically 
sound application of the public trust doctrine recognizes, as the Romans 
did, the air and atmosphere as critical public resources relied on by all and 
protected under the public trust doctrine. The government therefore plays 
an important role in regulating emissions. This is so even if government 
involvement makes continued use of fossil fuels less profitable through
regulation, or perhaps even outright prohibits extraction of some fossil 
fuels.95 For example, the continued leasing of minerals on federally-owned
lands also raises serious concerns.96 Courts should recognize application
of the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere. In doing so, fracking operations
(and the ultimate burning of those fossil fuels) may only be permitted if 
they preserve necessary rights of the public in the atmosphere and other public 
trust resources. This is the same core principle recognized in Judge Aiken’s
ruling in the Juliana case, even though she framed it in substantive due process 
terms.97 
Recognition of the impacts of fracking on public trust resources98 would
have several key benefits for courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.
Most importantly, acknowledgment of the threats fracking poses to the
public trust would embolden government officials to both enforce existing 
laws and enact new laws to protect trust resources. Additional government 
enforcement and legislative action in the fracking arena should be free 
from fears of not only burdensome litigation, but also crushing liability under
the Takings Clause.99 Thus, assuming they can overcome the political influence
93. How Climate Change Effects Fishing, CLIMATE CENT. (Aug. 22, 2018), https:// 
www.climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/how-climate-change-affects-fishing [https://perma.cc/
FZ6Q-L8Z4]. 
94. IPCC, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 18, at 4.
95. The latter may occur even when mineral interests in the desired-extraction zones are
privately owned. 
96. Still, issues of leasing minerals on federal lands poses an easier case than that 
of restrictions on privately-owned minerals. 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 61–64. 
98. This Article is not the first work to propose or recognize the impact of fracking 
on public trust resources. See e.g., Mary Christina Wood & Rance Shaw, Enforcing Human
Rights Against Fracking Through the Public Trust Principle, Response to Center for Human
Rights and Nature Questions for a Resilient Future: Does Fracking Violate Human Rights?
(2017), https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/Enforcing_Human_Rights_Against_
Fracking_Through_the_Public_Trust_Principle_.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHK4-3EDK].
99. Existing literature on the takings clause indicates the threat of takings liability 
causes government to lose the will to regulate to address societal harms. See John D. 
Echeverria & Thekla Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings Legislation: Lessons from
Democracy’s Laboratories, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 444 (2009). This fear of takings 
86
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of the oil and gas industry,100 governments would have latitude to fairly
balance competing interests while fulfilling the duty to protect the public—
including future generations—from the worst impacts of climate change.  
As a result, more jurisdictions would be emboldened to follow New York’s 
lead and ban fracking, or California’s in enacting and implementing 
aggressive climate change policy.  Still, the public trust doctrine may be 
utilized to prod reluctant governments to take action on climate change
when political dynamics would otherwise thwart any meaningful action.  
The public trust doctrine can thus be used in litigation and other contexts 
to force public debate and perhaps even development of plans to address
the impacts of fracking on public trust resources.
For takings liability, it would be important for courts to continue recognizing 
it would be important for courts to continue recognizing the public trust 
doctrine as a background principle of law. In relation to fracking, a judicial
decision that property interests in minerals like oil and gas do not create an
absolute right to extract those minerals would be incredibly important. Novel 
as such a holding may seem, it would be within existing confines of takings 
law. Lucas created an absurd bright line rule requiring compensation if all value 
of property is reduced by regulation. In doing so, the Court clarified issues
in takings law that previously went unaddressed. Because the Court opted not 
to overturn past precedents that immunized police power regulations from
takings liability,101 it was forced to grapple with the implications of its per
se rule.102 Accordingly, courts must now carefully delineate the property
right allegedly restricted. In the fracking context, this means the property 
right at issue is not merely the right to extract oil and gas, but also the right 
to use the oil and gas in a way that harms the public by polluting the air and 
impacting land, water, and wildlife resources. When courts recognize 
that mineral interest owners may not take a stick held in their “bundle” 
of rights and effectively poke their neighbors in the eye (by contributing
to climate change), the takings analysis provides a fair resolution for all.  This
is not to say, however, that government regulation of fracking cannot be
liability is also common in the context of regulation of fracking. See Kevin J. Lynch, A 
Fracking Mess: Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings of Oil and Gas Property Rights, 43
COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 335, 403 (2018).
100. Of course, this is the huge problem that has long impeded progress of addressing 
climate change. It is currently a major impediment in many jurisdictions in the United States.
101. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992) (discussing Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); and Miller 
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)).
102. Id. at 1022. 
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so unfair that the public must compensate the private interests affected.  
But in general, reasonable restrictions on fracking would not require 
just compensation, and thus private interests should not be able to block 
necessary steps to protect public trust resources by threatening crushing
takings liability. 
There is one caveat to this expansive discussion of fracking based on 
current takings law. The Supreme Court should not expand takings liability 
any further. In fact, the Court should scale back regulatory takings jurisprudence 
from its flawed and incoherent attempts to rein in government regulation—
particularly environmental regulation. However, I cannot say with any
confidence that the currently composed Supreme Court will not push back
against any current and future attempts to restrict fracking or otherwise
address climate change.103 It is entirely possible the Court will limit the
availability of defenses to takings, including those centered on the public 
trust doctrine. Such a last gasp attempt to preserve both the status quo and 
interests of fossil fuel proponents would cause serious harm to future generations
if not checked by available political remedies. Still, the Court’s conservative
majority may attempt to thwart efforts aimed at addressing the urgent climate 
change crisis and the serious health and safety impacts of fracking.104 
Finally, it is important to consider use of the public trust doctrine as a 
sword (as a stimulus of government action) to address climate change and 
other impacts of fracking. Use of the public trust doctrine in this way does 
not mean that fracking can never be allowed by government in any place.
However, it is essential for courts to state clearly that government as a
sovereign has an obligation to protect public trust resources from harm for
the benefit of trust beneficiaries (the public), particularly when the government’s 
own actions or authorization of private action causes or contributes to the 
harm. The public trust doctrine can thus be used in litigation, but a strong
judicial ruling that supports applying public trust doctrine to fracking
would benefit many for years to come. On a case-by-case basis, the public 
trust doctrine could be used to force government action and to address problems
caused by fracking in areas where political actors would otherwise abdicate
their fiduciary duties. This is an important role that judges, who are insulated
from political forces as compared to elected officials, can play in our legal
system.  This does not mean judges will determine climate change policy
103. This assumes no further changes in Justices or responses to the lack of legitimacy of
recent Supreme Court appointees.
104. Of course, this applies not only to fracking. As Professor Holly Doremus has noted, 
irrigators in California feel increasingly empowered to file takings claims when environmental 
restrictions threaten to reduce their available water supplies. Glen Martin, Could the Feds
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for the country. Rather, judicial rulings may impose pressure on elected
officials and agency experts to perform the hard work of balancing competing 
private and public interests.
Beyond litigation, a strong public trust doctrine applied to fracking may 
also be used in the administrative and legislative arenas.  The public trust 
doctrine would add a strong argument in favor of public interest groups
seeking, for example, greater environmental protections or limits on fossil 
fuel extraction and use. It would provide a strong argument for the notion 
that, at minimum, private parties should not be forced to extract oil and gas
on their property. The doctrine may also provide an important tool for the
public to combat the granting of permits to fracking facilities at the state
level. It would provide even greater force when government-owned minerals
are proposed for leasing, where such leasing would cause unacceptable harm 
to traditional public trust resources (e.g., oceans, rivers, and wildlife). 
VI. CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine is a venerable legal principle that recognizes a 
central role of government—state and federal—as both a sovereign and
fiduciary.  Some trust resources are inevitably used by the public as commons, 
and unchecked private exploitation of those resources makes everyone, 
even those exploiting the resources, worse off in the aggregate. Thus,
government has an important and unique role as a fiduciary in protecting 
these resources. Longstanding recognition of certain public trust resources 
existed even before the United States—specifically oceans, rivers, wildlife,
and the air. Fracking has the potential to impact each of those, either directly 
or indirectly through its long-recognized contributions to climate change.  
The public trust doctrine thus provides that state and federal governments 
have fiduciary obligations to restrict fracking so as to ultimately prevent
harming public trust resources. The doctrine also insulates government
regulation from takings liability when those regulations are fairly based
on protecting public trust resources. Thus, state and federal courts should 
continue to recognize the public trust doctrine as an important background 
principle of law. Further, the courts should explicitly hold that fracking 
implicates public trust concerns, such that government-sanctioning of fracking 
necessarily contradicts governments’ fiduciary obligations to protect trust
resources for its beneficiaries—present and future members of the public 
alike. Anything less would enable private interests to frack the public trust,
leaving present and future generations worse off. 
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